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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Christopher Briggs was charged with Stalking in the Second Degree, 
misdemeanor, a violation of Idaho Code 18-7906. The matter was charged by 
way of citation. R., p. 6. The court appointed counsel and the matter proceeded 
to trial. On the day of trial, and without advance notice to defense counsel or the 
court, the State of Idaho filed a formal criminal complaint at trial charging 
Stalking in Second Degree, as follows: 
COUNT 1: STALKING IN THE SECOND DEGREE, LC. 18- 7906, 
said crime being committed as follows to wit: 
That the Defendant, Christopher D. Briggs, on or about the 1st day 
of April, 2009, through the 1st day of June, 2009, in the City of 
Garden City, County of Ada, State of Idaho, did knowingly and 
maliciously engage in a course of conduct that seriously alarmed, 
annoyed or harassed Cassandra Menear, which would cause a 
reasonable person substantial emotional distress, and/ or engage in 
a course of conduct that would cause a reasonable person to be in 
fear of death or physical injury, to wit: committed the following 
repeated acts of nonconsensual contact: repeatedly e-mailed, 
telephoned or texted Cassandra Menear and/ or other people who 
would have knowledge of her whereabouts and/ or reported 
Cassandra Menear as a missing person and/ or refused to leave the 
premises when he appeared at Cassandra Menear's residence and/ 
or yelled threats outside Cassandra Menear's residence and/ or used 
Cassandra Menear's cell phone's GPS feature to follow her 
movements, in violation of Idaho Code 18-7906. R., p. 82. 
The defense did not object to the late filing of this complaint; the matter 
proceeded to jury trial on December 10, 2010. 
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The evidence at trial established that Briggs and the victim Cassie Menear 
lived together in a romantic relationship until the time of their breakup sometime 
at the end of May, 2009. According to Cassie, Briggs was upset with the breakup 
and wanted to get back together. She testified that the last conversation was 
emotional, but uneventful: 
CASSIE: The conversation -- the last conversation we had was 
the day that I was trying to get my phone from him. And we 
were talking, and it was about why it couldn't work. And I was 
giving him my reasons. And he was trying to pursue getting 
back together. And I let him know that wasn't an option." Tr. 
p. 77, 111-8. 
Cassie testified on direct that Briggs was angry and upset at the breakup, 
but there was no evidence introduced at trial that Briggs directly threatened her 
at this time or any other time, on the phone, email, by text, or in any manner. 
Cassie did testify to her belief that friends had received texts "asking them if they 
knew where I was, telling them about our relationship, threatening, things like 
that." Tr. p. 50, 11. Without objection from the defense the prosecutor followed up 
and elicited this highly prejudicial and unsubstantiated hearsay: 
Q. Threatening, like what kind of threats? 
A. Harm, just if they knew where I was that -- and that if they didn't tell 
him that they would be hurt. 
Q. Oh, so Mr. Briggs is telling them that if they didn't say where you 
were that they would be -- that he would hurt them? 
A. Yes, if they knew and they didn't say, that they would be --- Tr. p. 50, 
11. 9-19. 
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This hearsay was not corroborated by a single document or the testimony 
from any witness at trial. Two witnesses were called by the State with regard to 
third party contacts: Michael Minear testified that Briggs contacted him and 
asked if he had seen her. Tr. p. 93, 11. 4-5; Stephanie Howard testified that Briggs 
sent her between 20 and 25 text messages in the week after the break up 
inquiring if Stephanie knew where Cassie staying. Tr. pp. 100-101. Briggs also 
=testified that he did text Stephanie Howard on one occasion and that the text 
messages were part of an ongoing conversation. Tr. p. 151, 11. 13-25. Briggs 
testified that he was concerned about Cassie's whereabouts and filed a missing 
person's report on the day that he was arrested. Tr. p. 160, 11. 10-21. 
The only contact between Cassie and Briggs occurred on June 1, 2009 
when Briggs showed up at the trailer of Crystal Halisel and yelled for 17 year old 
James Dobson to come out and fight. Briggs testified on direct that the break up 
occurred the day before and that he called Crystal Halisel' s phone to try and get 
in touch with her but not one answered. Tr. p. 143, 11. 10-11. James Dobson called 
him back on the cell phone and called Briggs "a punk" while threatening to 
"shoot" Briggs. Tr. p. 143.11. 13-16. Briggs went over to call Dobson out for a 
fight. Briggs did not bring a weapon. Tr. p. 14811. 16-18. 
When Briggs arrived at Halisel' s garden city trailer he called Dobson to 
come out but Dobson had already left. Briggs yelled to his ex-girlfriend Cassie to 
"come out and get the phone" [that belonged to her and Briggs]. Tr. p. 60, 11. 
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14-17. Cassie testified at trial that she was scared of Briggs and thought he was 
going to harm her if she left the trailer. She did not leave the trailer. Garden City 
Police responded and arrested Briggs. Briggs denied ever threatening Dobson 
with a weapon; Briggs was not in possession of a gun. Tr. p. 148, 11. 16-23. 
Other than this single event, the evidence at trial consisted of inadmissible 
comment on evidence that was never admitted, hearsay, and evidence of speech 
that was constitutionally protected activity. Highlights of the evidence and 
comments include: 
The CPS Tracking Device. Cassie testified that she and Briggs shared a 
cell phone and that Briggs had activated a CPS feature that allowed Briggs to 
track the phone and presumably the whereabouts of Cassie. Tr. p. 43. Cassie did 
not have this phone with her at any time after the break up, but this evidence 
was presented to suggest that Briggs was a dangerous stalker. The jury was 
instructed under Instruction No. 13. that "nonconsensual contact" included 
"following the victim or maintaining surveillance, including by electronic means, 
on the victim." Many of today's cell phones contain CPS features that allmv the 
owner to locate the phone remotely. 
Questions and comments about a gun. Immediately following Cassie's 
testimony regarding the breakup, the prosecuting attorney questioned Cassie 
about Briggs having "access to a gun." Tr. p. 47 1112-16. Although Cassie 
testified that she never saw Briggs with a gun, nor were any threats ever made, 
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the questioning clearly established that Briggs had "access to a gun." This 
created the dangerous suggestion that Briggs was a violent man capable of using 
the gun at any moment. Why the defense attorney did not object to this line of 
questioning is unknown, but no objection was forthcoming in a very damaging 
line of questioning regarding activity that was protected by the Second 
Amendment of the Constitution. p. 46-48. 
Emails. The criminal complaint charges Briggs with harassing the victim 
by email. No such emails were admitted at trial. Although the prosecution 
attempted to introduce two emails that the victim brought to court with her 
(supposedly from Briggs) the court properly rejected this evidence. Nonetheless 
Briggs's conviction was based upon the repeated argument of the prosecuting 
argument in closing that Briggs was sending "electronic communications to the 
victim." The prosecution refers to "emails, the phone calls, the texts, the My 
Space looking for her" p. 197, 11. 18-21. The prosecution states that "he sent all 
kinds of email, six out of seven in just four days or so." Tr. p. 190, 11. 9-12. The 
jury was never informed that written nonthreatening communications are 
constitutionally protected free speech. The record is devoid of any instruction on 
the First Amendment in this case. 
Text Messages. Witnesses Stephanie Howard and Michael Menear 
testified that Briggs attempted to contact them, or did contact them, by phone or 
text message with an inquiry as to Cassie's whereabouts shortly after the 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF -5-
breakup. No threats were made by the defendant Briggs to either witness. 
Idaho Code 18-7906 does not prohibit any communications made between a 
defendant and third parties. Such communications may also be protected as free 
speech in the absence of threats or true intimidation. 
Attempting to contact the victim by phone. There is no evidence in the 
record that Briggs contacted Cassie after the break on a telephone. Briggs was in 
possession of the jointly owned cell phone and didn't have Cassie's telephone 
number. Although Briggs testified that he did try to contact Cassie through a 
friend, he did so for a legitimate purpose. Tr. 141-143. Nontheless the 
prosecution argued, and the court accepted, the proposition that Briggs used the 
telephone to stalk Cassie. 
THE TURY INSTRUCTIONS 
At trial the the magistrate court gave an improper jury instruction which 
improperly defined "course of conduct" under the Stalking Law. 
Instruction No. 12. read: 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Stalking, the state must 
prove each of the following: 
1. on or about April 1 2009 to June 1, 2009 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant Christopher Briggs 
4. knowingly and maliciously engaged in a course of conduct 
that seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed Cassandra 
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Menear, and was such as would cause a reasonable person 
substantial emotional distress, OR 
engaged in a course of conduct such as would cause a 
reasonable person to be in fear of death or physical injury, 
or in fear of the death or physical injury of a family member. 
If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 
you must find the defendant guilty. If any of the above has not been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant 
not guilty. R., p. 75. 
Instruction No. 12 does not contain the mens rea element of "knowingly 
and maliciously" engaging in conduct that would cause a reasonable fear of 
injury or death. The major problem, however, came with Instruction No. 13 in 
which the court instructed the jury under and old pattern instruction that: 
"Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed of a 
series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a 
continuity of purpose. Course of conduct does not include 
constitutionally protected activity. R., p. 76. 
Under the old law and old pattern instructions a "course of conduct" was 
defined as "a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of 
time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose." Under the revised 
statute of 2004, a "course of conduct" was defined as "repeated acts of 
nonconsensual contact involving the victim or household member of the 
victim" provided that "constitutionally protected activity is not included in 
this definition." LC. 18-7906. 
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Neither version of the statute defines constitutionally protected activity 
such as the right of free speech or freedom of association as guaranteed by the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution or under the protections of 
Article 1, Section 9 of the Idaho Constitution. The court gave no jury instruction 
at all in this regard. 
Although neither counsel initially objected to the improper jury 
instructions, the court recognized error during closing argument but did not 
inform counsel of the problem until after the jury reached a verdict. Magistrate 
Judge Watkins then informed counsel that the "course of conduct" instruction he 
gave under the old pattern instructions "is not the language that tracks with the 
statute as the statute was amended." Tr. p. 203, 11 23 - 25. The magistrate 
acknowledged that it was "concerned about the instruction" but scheduled the 
matter for a post trial motion hearing. (Tr. p. 204, 11. 15-16). Briggs was found 
guilty by the jury. 
The court then polled the jury: 
THE COURT: Mr. Koontz, is this your true and accurate verdict? 
MR. KOONTZ: Based upon the instructions we were given, yes. Tr.,p. 202. 
The court noted that it believed Mr. Koontz' comment was troubling in 
light of the instructions given. Tr. p. 204, 11 22-25. Nonetheless, and despite the 
court's stated concern that the jury had may have been mislead, Judge Watkins 
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later denied a written motion for a mistrial. Memorandum Decision of April 14, 
2010. R. 113. 
The record is clear that the State of Idaho made its argument for 
conviction based upon error in law and substantial infringement on 
constitutionally protected speech: 
PROSECUTOR: "Well, what's a course of conduct? Well thankfully 
we have some definitions. Court of conduct you're going to find out 
is a pattern of conduct, series of acts over a period of time, however 
short. In this particular instance, the period of time is alleged as 
April through June. But if you think, well, it kind of more or less 
occurred at the end of May through June 1st, that's fine. You can still 
find him guilty of that. It just has to have happened on or between 
April and June, 1st. Okay. Course of conduct, however short, a 
continued continuity of purpose. In this particular case the 
continuity of purpose is, of course, he is trying to find Case. He's 
making these phone calls, these texts, these messages on various like 
My Space account type things for a purpose, and that is to find 
Cassie." Tr. p. 180, 11. 4 -19. 
In denying the written motion for mistrial, the magistrate recognized that 
it had committed error in the instructions, and that this error was "fundamental 
error." R. 113, Memorandum Decision, at p. 4. Nonetheless, the magistrate court 
ruled that the error was harmless based upon the theory that the State had 
proven its case through a series of "nonconsensual contacts" between the 
defendant and the victim. The magistrate did not engage in any evaluation of 
whether such contacts might be protected as free speech under the First 
Amendment or under Article 1, Section 9 of the Idaho Constitution. 
On appeal the district court affirmed the decision of the magistrate court. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the magistrate court improperly instruct and mislead the jury as to 
the elements of the crime? 
2. Were the jury instructions so fundamentally flawed to deprive Briggs 
of a fair trial without the protections afforded by the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of the Idaho Constitution? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The magistrate court improperly instructed and mislead the jury as to the 
elements of the crime . 
A. Introduction. 
In this case the magistrate recognized error in the instruction while the 
jury was deliberating. The court brought this to the attention of counsel and the 
defense moved for a mistrial. This motion was not granted and the jury found 
the defendant Briggs guilty of Stalking in the Second Degree, a misdemeanor 
under Idaho law. The court then set the matter for a hearing on the motion for 
mistrial and allowed both parties the opportunity for briefing. 
In its Memorandum Decision of April 14, 2010 the magistrate held that 
Briggs was denied due process of law: 
While the jury was correctly instructed that they had to find a 
"course of conduct" that caused the required harm, they were not 
instructed that at "course of conduct" must be composed of certain 
"nonconsensual contact." This was not the correct manner in which 
to instruct the jury. 
For purposes of this decision, the court will assume that if an error 
occurred in the instructions, that such an error would be 
fundamental. If a material element was left out of the instructions, 
then Briggs was certainly deprived of due process. However, even 
when a fundamental error has occurred, a new trial is unwarranted 
if the fundamental error was harmless. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 
165 P.3d 273 (2007). In deciding whether error was harmless, the 
Supreme Court suggested that the question is "whether there is a 
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF -11-
contributed to the conviction." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 
18,23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827, 17 L.Ed. 2d 705, 710 (1967). R. p. 116. 
The magistrate then wrongly concluded that such error was harmless 
because the State had only proven conduct that would be nonconsensual and 
illegal under the current law. The magistrate concluded that "all of the acts that 
the state alleged, and upon which they presented evidence, fall into the category 
of 'nonconsensual acts'." R., p. 117. 
B. Standard of Review. 
In State v. Adamick, 2012 Opinion No. 23, the Idaho Supreme Court 
articulated the standard for reversible error with regard to jury instructions: 
The issue of whether a particular jury instruction is necessary and 
whether the jury has been properly instructed is a matter of law 
over which this Court exercises free review. This Court reviews 
jury instructions to ascertain whether, when considered as a 
whole, they fairly and adequately present the issues and state the 
applicable law. (internal citations omitted). 
No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an 
instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to 
consider its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to which the 
party objects and the grounds of the objection." Idaho Crim. R. 
30(b ). When a defendant has objected to an instruction, we will 
apply the harmless error test articulated in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209,227,245 P.3d 961, (2010). Typically, under the harmless error 
test, once the defendant shows that a constitutional violation 
occurred, the State has the burden of demonstrating beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the violation did not contribute to the jury's 
verdict. Id. If the jury reached its verdict based on an erroneous 
instruction, we will generally vacate and remand for a new trial. Id. 
at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. However, where the jury received proper 
instruction on all but one element of an offense, and where the 
Court "concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted 
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element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming 
evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same 
absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly found to be 
harmless." Id. 
The question whether the jury was properly instructed is one of law over 
which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 32, 
951 P.2d 1249, 1259 (1997); State v. Cherry, 139 Idaho 579,585, 83 P.3d 123, 129 
(Ct.App.2003). On appeal, jury instructions are viewed as a whole, not 
individually, to determine whether the jury was properly and adequately 
instructed on the applicable law. State v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644,646,945 P.2d 
1390, 1392 (Ct.App.1997). 
A jury must be instructed on all matters of law necessary for its 
information. State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 172, 90 P.3d 920, 922 (Ct.App.2004); 
State v. Halbesleben, 139 Idaho 165, 168-69, 75 P.3d 219, 222-23 (Ct.App.2003). 
This requires that the jury be instructed with respect to all elements of the 
charged offense. Any omission of an element of a crime lightens the prosecution's 
burden of proof and is therefore impermissible. State v. Broadhead, 139 Idaho 
663,666, 84 P.3d 599,602 (Ct.App.2004); Halbesleben, 139 Idaho at 169, 75 P.3d at 
223. To be reversible error, an instruction must mislead the jury or prejudice the 
defendant. State v. Hanson, 130 Idaho 842, 844, 949 P.2d 590,592 (Ct.App.1997). If 
a fundamental error has occurred, a new trial is unwarranted only if the 
fundamental error was harmless. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 165 P.3d 273 
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(2007). The United States Supreme Court has stated that error is not harmless if 
there is "a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have 
contributed to the conviction." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S. Ct. 
824, 827, 17 L.Ed. 2d 705, 710 (1967). 
In State v. Hansell, 141 Idaho 587 (Idaho App. 2005), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals defined the harmless error doctrine in the area of jury instructions. The 
harmless error analysis may be applied when a court omits an essential element 
from the instructions to the jury. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15, 119 S.Ct. 
1827, 1836, 144 L.Ed.2d 35, 51 (1999); State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 73, 79, 90 P.3d 
298, 304 (2004). When a jury is not instructed as to an element of an offense, the 
standard for determining harmlessness is "whether the record contains evidence 
that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted 
element." Neder, 527 U.S. at 19, 119 S.Ct. at 1839, 144 L.Ed.2d at 53. If, after 
examining the record, the reviewing court "cannot conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error ... it 
should not find the error harmless." cited in State v. Hansell, supra. 
Misleading the jury as to the elements of a crime is proper grounds for 
reversal in Idaho if it lessens the State's burden of proof, State v. Lilly, 142 Idaho 
70 122 P.3d 1170 (Idaho App. 2005) or if the omitted element was contested at 
trial. State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 64 P.3d 296 (2002). 
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C. Argument. 
Applying these standards, the instructions given in this case were 
misleading as to the proper elements of the crime. 
Judge Watkins recognized that the instructions confused and mislead the 
jury as closing arguments took place. The court stated there was a "decent 
likelihood that the jury has been misinstructed in this case." Tr. p. 203. The 
magistrate recognized the confusion of the jury foreman. Tr. p. 204. The 
magistrate acknowledged that if there was error, it was "fundamental" if a 
material element was left out of the instructions. Memorandum Decision at p. 4. 
But the court did not reverse, holding: 
the potential harm in instructing the jury as the court did was that 
the jury could possibly find that Briggs engaged in acts that caused 
the required harm, but that such acts were not "nonconsensual 
contact" as defined by the statute. That harm was not present in 
this case because all of the "acts" that the state alleged, and upon 
which they presented evidence, fall into the category of 
"nonconsensual acts." Memorandum Decision, p. 5. 
This decision was erroneous for two reasons: 1) The court did not 
address the fundamental problem of whether the jury could have convicted 
based upon anything less than repeated acts of nonconsensual conduct, and; 2) 
the record is replete with communications that are constitutionally protected. 
In the first instance the verdict should be reversed based upon the error in 
defining the "course of conduct." The defense contended, and the record 
supports, the proposition that this case did not constitute a stalking case at all, 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF -15-
I 
I ~ 
I 
• I 
M 
I ' 
Ii' 
• 
' I 
I 
I· 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
but rather rather a disturbing the peace or an attempted fighting charge between 
James Dobson, a seventeen year old male, and the defendant. Following a phone 
conversation with Dobbs, Briggs responded to Dobson's location to challenge 
him to a fight. Tr. p. 143. It is also undisputed that Briggs' girlfriend, Cassie, was 
at the trailer at the time that Briggs called Dobson out for a fight and that she was 
scared. This is the conduct or communication that likely lead to Briggs' 
conviction and it was based upon the erroneous instruction of defining a "course 
of conduct ..... however short ..... evidencing a continuity of purpose." 
The prosecutor argued this point precisely in closing and it is likely that 
the jury could have convicted Briggs of Stalking based solely upon his encounter 
with Dobbs and Cassie at the trailer. The prosecutor argued: 
PROSECUTOR: "Well, what's a course of conduct? Well thankfully 
we have some definitions. Court of conduct you're going to find out 
is a pattern of conduct, series of acts over a period of time, however 
short. In this particular instance, the period of time is alleged as 
April through June. But if you think, well, it kind of more or less 
occurred at the end of May through June 1st, that's fine. You can 
still find him guilty of that. It just has to have happened on or 
between April and June, 1st. Okay. Course of conduct, however 
short, a continued continuity of purpose. In this particular case the 
continuity of purpose is, of course, he is trying to find Case. He's 
making these phone calls, these texts, these messages on various like 
My Space account type things for a purpose, and that is to find 
Cassie." Tr. p. 180, 11. 4 -19. 
This does not meet the statutory definition of stalking which requires 
"repeated acts of nonconsensual contact" that is not "constitutionally protected 
activity." This court should reverse because the record shows that the jury was 
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mislead could have convicted Briggs based upon a single act of disturbing the 
peace. 
It is important to note that the victim did not testify to receiving any 
threatening telephone, email or other communications from Briggs as any time 
after the breakup. Cassie testified that Briggs attempted to contact her using 
messages, emails, and my space "up to ten times" but the message was that he 
was worried about her and where she was. Tr. pp. 51-52. 
There is no evidence in the record that Briggs was even informed to 
cease communication with Cassie. Therefore, the June 1, 2009 incident likely 
formed the basis for the conviction when Briggs arrived at the trailer and yelled 
to Cassie to "come out and get the phone" [that belonged to her and Briggs]. Tr. 
p. 60, 11. 14-17. Because the jury was never informed that that "repeated acts of 
nonconsensual contact" were required, the jury was mislead and the conviction 
should be overturned. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF -17-
ARGUMENT 
IL 
IL The jury instructions were fundamentally flawed depriving Briggs of 
a fair trial and the protections afforded by the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and the provisions of Article 1, Section 9 of the Idaho 
Constitution. 
A. Introduction. 
When a defendant fails to object to a jury instruction, we will still 
review the jury instruction for fundamental error. State v. Johnson, 
145 Idaho 970,977, 188 P.3d 912,919 (2008); see also State v. Perry, 
150 Idaho at 224,245 P.3d at 976 ("If the a1leged error was not 
followed by a contemporaneous objection, it shall only be 
reviewed ... under Idaho's fundamental error doctrine."). Before 
we consider whether there was fundamental error, we must first 
determine whether the trial court erred at all. Johnson, 145 Idaho at 
977, 188 P.3d at 919. The Perry fundamental error test requires the 
defendant to show three things: (1) the alleged error violated an 
unwaived constitutional right; (2) the alleged error plainly exists; 
and (3) the alleged error was not harmless. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 
245 P.3d at 980. 
The question whether the jury was properly instructed is one of law over 
which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 32, 
951 P.2d 1249, 1259 (1997); State v. Cherry, 139 Idaho 579,585, 83 P.3d 123, 129 
(Ct.App.2003). 
Applying this standard, the first part of the analysis is to determine 
whether there was error in the instructions. In this case it is clear that Briggs did 
not request, nor did the court give the jury any instruction as to what activity or 
speech was "constitutionally protected activity." The jury was never informed as 
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to protections provided for under the First Amendment or under Article 1, 
Section 9 of the Idaho Constitution. The jury never understood that Briggs had a 
fundamental constitutional right to contact Cassie or third parties in a non 
threatening manner. 
B. Standard of Review. 
This court outlined the broad protections afforded any citizen in State v. 
Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 88 P.3d 704 (2004): 
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
protects both actual speech and symbolic or expressive conduct. 
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003). 
A statute that punishes only spoken words is facially overbroad if it 
is susceptible of application to speech that is protected by the First 
Amendment. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 31 
L.Ed.2d 408 (1972). The overbreadth doctrine has less application, 
however, to conduct. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 123 S.Ct. 2191, 
156 L.Ed.2d 148 (2003). In the latter circumstance, the statute will 
not be held overly broad unless its application to protected speech 
is substantial, not only in an absolute sense but also relative to the 
scope of the law's plainly legitimate applications. Id. Nonverbal 
expressive activity can be banned because of the action it entails as 
long as such ban is unrelated to the ideas it expresses. R.A.V. v. St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). Likewise, 
reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions on speech may be 
upheld if they are justified without reference to the content of the 
speech, and speech may be proscribed based upon a non-content 
element, such as noise. Id. The Supreme Court has permitted 
restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, such 
as obscenity, defamation, fighting words, true threats, and 
intimidation. As it stated in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83, 
112 S.Ct. 2538, 2542-43, 120 L.Ed.2d 305, 317 (1992): 
In Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 1548, 155 
L.Ed.2d 535, 552 (2003) (citations omitted), the United States 
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Supreme Court held that true threats are not protected by the First 
Amendment, nor is intimidation when it is a type of true threat. 
"True threats" encompass those statements where the speaker 
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit 
an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of 
individuals. The speaker need actually intend to carry out the 
threat. Rather, a prohibition of true threats "protect[s] individuals 
from the fear of violence" and "from the disruption that fear 
engenders," in addition to protecting people "from the possibility 
that the threatened violence will occur." Intimidation in the 
constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true 
threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of 
persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm 
or death. 
C. Argument. 
When constitutional analysis is applied, the fundamental error of the jury 
instructions becomes more clear. Other than the encounter at the trailer, the 
evidence at trial consisted of improper prosecutorial comment on evidence never 
admitted, hearsay, and evidence of constitutionally protected activity. 
Briggs did object to the introduction to the contents of two emails 
allegedly written by Briggs. Tr. p. 80 -84. The objection was sustained. Briggs 
also objected to the contents of My Space postings. Tr. 128-130. This objection 
was also sustained. Tr. p. 130. Absent this evidence all that is known from the 
record is the testimony of Cassie that she received "ten messages" Tr. p. 52, 1. 18, 
none of which contained any threats, and her assertion hearsay assertion that 
Briggs wrote threatening messages to other persons, none of whom testified at 
trial. Tr. p. 69-70. It is impossible to analyze the content of this speech, because 
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there is no record. In fact, Cassie testified that Briggs did not call her. Tr. p. 51, 11. 
1-3. But that testimony didn't stop the prosecutor from arguing that Briggs "was 
contacting her by telephone, of course he did ....... central to the case." Tr. p. 90, 11. 
6-7. An analysis of the record discloses nothing of evidentiary value in terms of a 
true threat or intimidation. 
Other than "fighting words" or "true threats" there is no speech or written 
word in our society that is not constitutionally protected free speech. The jury 
should have been informed of the broad protection of the First Amendment and 
very narrow restriction that can apply in determining what constitutes 
"constitutionally protected activity" under the Stalking Law. The jury was not 
informed of the language of the First Amendment in any regard. The error in the 
instructions plainly exists. Moreover, is nothing in the court record to indicate 
that Briggs waived the protections of the First Amendment or Article 1, Section 9 
of the Idaho Constitution. The first two prongs of the Fundamental Error 
doctrine outlined in Perry are satisfied. 
Under the third prong of Perry, Briggs must demonstrate that the error 
was not harmless, meaning that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 245 P.3d 961 (2010). 
As applied, Christopher Briggs, can demonstrate substantial intrusion into 
constitutionally protected activity in the pursuit of this criminal conviction. 
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Christopher Briggs was convicted for conduct that was completely lawful. 
Examples in the record of protected activity include: 
The GPS Tracking Device. Many cell phones in the united states contains 
a chip that can be tracked or tracked or traced using cell phone tower 
triangulation, or in more expensive phones, through GPS tracking. Although the 
evidence in this case was not detailed, apparently Briggs and his girlfriend Case 
owned a Sprint phone with such a feature. Tr., p. 43. Cassie testified that Briggs 
made mention of a feature that allowed him to locate the phone online using 
some software. Tr., p. 43. That was all. There was no testimony that Briggs was 
repeatedly tracked Cassie or used the information against her in any way. 
Ultimately Briggs' comment was irrelevant or immaterial and without 
foundation as to a course of conduct designed to threaten or intimidate a victim, 
but it became the basis for the closing argument. Briggs had a right to mention 
the tracking feature of the phone and the right to use it if he so desired. 
The Gun. Immediately following the testimony regarding the breakup, 
the prosecuting attorney questioned Cassie about comments made by Briggs as 
having "access to a gun." Tr. p. 47 1112-16. Although Cassie testified that she 
never saw Briggs with a gun, the suggestion that Briggs was a bad player with a 
gun calls into question activity that was protected by the Second Amendment of 
the Constitution. Again, there was no foundation or testimony that Briggs 
threatened anyone with a gun, only the prejudicial suggestion that he was a 
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dangerous man with a gun. Once again, Briggs' conviction was obtained by 
intruding on constitutionally protected activity. 
The Emails. There were no emails admitted at trial. Although the 
prosecution attempted to introduce two emails that the victim brought to court 
with her (and supposedly from Briggs) the court rejected the evidence. 
Nonetheless Briggs's conviction was premised upon the idea that he was sending 
"electronic communications to the victim." The prosecution refers to "emails, the 
phone calls, the texts, the My Space looking for her" Tr. p. 197, 11. 18-21. The 
prosecution states that "he sent all kinds of email, six out of seven in just four 
days or so." Tr. p. 190, 11. 9-12. In the absence of a true threats or intimidation, 
those emails, were protected speech. The jury did not know this because the 
jury was not advised as to what constituted protected speech. The jury 
instructions were fundamentally flawed in this case and deprived Briggs of a fair 
trial. 
Text Messages and My Space Postings. The prosecutor attempted to 
introduce evidence that Briggs sent text messages to Cassie's friends looking for 
her, and posting a message on somebody's my space account. No documents or 
evidence were offered to prove the content of any of these out of court 
statements. Nonetheless the argument presented itself throughout the trial and 
in closing argument this conduct or speech was illegal or constihlted stalking. 
Although the Idaho Stalking Law does not apply to contacts with third parties, at 
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a minimum the jury should have been advised that Briggs had a constitutional 
right to send the nonthreatening text messages. That is exactly what Briggs did 
according to the two witnesses who testified at trial. 
Attempting to contact the victim by phone. The magistrate court ruled 
that this was a basis for denying the motion for a new trial. There is nothing in 
any statute that makes it illegal to attempt to contact a person by telephone for 
any reason other than for the purpose of threatening or intimidating the person. 
Briggs didn't even do that. Again, there is no evidence in the record that Briggs 
ever contacted Cassie directly on the phone after the break up. 
CONCLUSION 
This conviction is seriously flawed. The court should vacate the conviction 
because the jury was not properly instructed on the critical elements of the crime 
and the jury was mislead. The court should also vacate the conviction for the 
reason that the jury instructions did not adequately inform the jury as to 
constitutional protections afforded to Briggs under the state and federal 
constitutions. 
Respectfully Submitted this /8 f~ay of April, 2012. 
< 2~ C/6~1 Jt_ 
Joseph L. Ellsworth 
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